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Abstract 
 
The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ 
have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been 
proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway.  
 
This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the 
dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three 
arguments:  the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion 
of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the 
disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. 
 
The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for 
rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and 
pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail 
freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, 
economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 
technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU 
choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network 
industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the 
emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is 
problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the 
presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive 
system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part 
tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in 
Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a 
competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers 
to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of 
competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for 
path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. 
 
The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal 
cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale 
for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the 
introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on 
removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination 
failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should 
not be assessed in a static perspective.  Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. 
Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost 
savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism 
may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway 
reform. 
 
The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform. 
 
N.B. The authors welcome comments on this version. To jpelkmans@coleurop.be  
 
 
JEL Codes:  L5, L9, O52, F15.
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Introduction  
 
For almost two centuries railways have played a key role in the European economy in providing 
valuable transport backbones across the continent and facilitating, if not stimulating, great 
industrial revolutions. However, the last three decades have witnessed a continued loss in market 
share for rail passenger and especially for freight services in intermodal transport competition. 
To some extent this phenomenon can be explained by exogenous factors and trends. 
Nevertheless, one cannot fail to observe internal failures in the sector, causing it to be incapable 
to adjust and respond to market changes over a long period of time and to shift to new business 
models. Moreover, state subsidies to rail have become or remained very substantial: they are only 
second to agricultural expenditures. 
 
After a lag, this unfortunate constellation has prompted a wave of national reforms aiming at:  
· greater scrutiny of and changes in business models, such as incorporation or privatisation, 
targeted subsidies (better exposing inefficiencies), much greater price differentiation 
(peakload pricing, interregional differentiation, service quality differentiation), etc. 
· introducing (EU-wide) competition, above all in freight services where the scope for doing so 
is considerable ; the idea behind the end of monopoly and exclusive rights is to generate 
powerful and lasting incentives for the improvement of structure and performance of the 
railways in the Union, hence its competitiveness and market share 
· re-regulation the railways by focusing on market failures (such as natural monopoly, safety 
and asymmetric information) over the entire internal market, thereby replacing old, 
inefficient and fragmented regulation with its enormous costs to economy and society. 
 
The paper discusses the economics of EU railway reform, currently in progress. After sketching 
the dramatic decline of rail, the basic case for reform is made in section 2. This case hinges on 
competitiveness, sustainability and (less) public money. We then proceed with the economic 
analysis of the sector, its market failures and its technical and economic barriers to entry in the 
incipient EU internal rail market in section 3. An economic understanding of the regulatory 
reform is facilitated by focusing first on vertical unbundling and the options for pricing (section 
4) and, subsequently, on the introduction of competition (section 5). Directly linked to 
unbundling, we take a closer look at the considerable problems of effectively preventing cross-
subsidisation (given a high share of common costs) and the (de) merits of marginal cost pricing, 
followed by a brief inspection of different options to obtain (full) cost recovery and cost 
transparency, and finally the coordination requirements for appropriate (cross-border) path 
allocation. In discussing the introduction of competition we focus on coordination costs, the pre-
requisites of welfare improving competition in rail and the nature of competition analysis derived 
from these considerations. 
 
Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions and provides five additional pointers for the way 
forward in EU railway reform. 
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I –  Highlights of EU railways decline 
 
Railways in the EU are not at all doing well. The decline in market share is large and seems 
irreversible. Extrapolation would spell extinction for freight rather soon, and at best a static 
position in passenger rails, as a marginal player in transport. A few highlights exemplify the 
dramatic nature of these trends. 
 
For the last 30 years,  in the presence of steady passenger and freight transport  growth of  2.5-
3% annually in Europe, EU railway transport has been in steep decline. For the transport sector 
as a whole, growth  was led by cross-border freight. The deepening of the internal market in the 
late 1980s and 1990s has reinforced this trend. However, the rail sector did not benefit from this 
development. In the case of freight transport, railways lost market share not only in relative but 
even in absolute terms. It is estimated that during the period 1990-2001, measured in 
tonnes/kilometres, freight transport in general rose by 25%, and road transport increased by 35% 
while rail freight transport decreased by 6%. During the period 1970-2001, rail’s market share 
collapsed from 21% to 7.8%.  (see figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1 - Growth and share of freight transport by modes between 1970 and 2001 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission  - Energy & Transport in Figures 2003 
 
  
The case of passenger transport is less dramatic but the trend is downward, too.  During the 
period 1970-2001, rail’s share in passenger transport decreased from 10% to 6%. 
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Table 1 - Passenger Transport Evolution in Europe. 
 
 Passenger 
cars 
Buses & 
Coaches 
Tram + 
Metro 
Railway Air 
1970 73.8 12.7 1.6 10.4 1.6 
1980 76.1 11.8 1.2 8.4 2.5 
1990 79.0 9.3 1.0 6.7 4.0 
1991 78.8 9.3 1.1 6.8 4.1 
1995 79.5 8.7 0.9 6.2 4.6 
1996 79.3 8.8 0.9 6.3 4.7 
1997 79.2 8.7 0.9 6.3 4.9 
1998 79.1 8.6 0.9 6.2 5.2 
1999 78.8 8.5 0.9 6.2 5.5 
2000 78.1 8.6 1.0 6.4 5.9 
2001 78.2 8.6 1.0 6.4 5.9 
 
      European Commission - Energy & Transport in Figures 2003 
 
It is alarming to observe the incapacity of railways to absorb traffic demand in times of economic 
growth. The establishment of the Internal Market was accompanied by buoyant economic growth 
that only saw a halt in 2001. In the period between 1995 and 2001 the European economy’s real 
GDP grew by a cumulative 16%. Over the same period, traffic units transported by rail grew by 
11% for freight and 13% for passengers, pointing to the failure to capture potential markets1. 
 
The reasons for this loss (especially in freight transport) are diverse, some exogenous and some 
endogenous to the sector. Among the exogenous reasons, a long-run trend is the transformation 
of the European economy from an industrial to a service-based one.  Within industry, a 
widespread adoption of just-in-time production processes has taken place, which inevitably entail 
flexible sourcing and adaptable transportation means. Besides these economic trends, one might 
consider as exogenous the impact of a strong policy preference (since World War II) and, later, 
individual preferences,  for road-based transportation.  
 
Endogenous reasons for rail not to perform adequately (see Table 22) can be summarised in the 
almost total lack of adaptation to dynamic markets and changed customer requirements. Markets 
in the EU and their associated trade flows have increasingly become cross-border while rail 
services were always kept national. Agreements for international transhipments were concluded 
on an ad-hoc and bilateral basis, thus closely resembling the bilateral agreements that still 
characterise intercontinental air transport.3  
 
                                                 
1  Study of the Financing of and Public Budget Contribution to Railways - NERA, December 2003 
2  EU-funded project RAILSERVE (EU Framework Programme 5th). In public hearings with established and potential rail customers and new 
entrants, the project identified a number of failures to comply with market demands due to the inflexibility and non-transparency of incumbent 
rail operators and to specific technological reasons. 
3  A common quotation in the industry says that « once a freight wagon is outside the national border of the country of origin, it is technically 
lost ». Its management, punctuality and integrity  rests under the responsibility of the other country’s national railway. The result is a lack of 
incentives for a performant service. See also White & Pelkmans, 2000 (CEPS) 
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Table 2 - Reasons for the decline of rail transportation 
 
Exogenous reasons - Transformation of other industries 
§ From  huge-stock-based to just-in-time production processes 
§ From low value/high volume to high value/small volume 
products  
- Policies and investments that favoured road transport instead of rail 
Endogenous reasons - Limited attention to customer care 
- Weak reliability and punctuality of shipments 
- Limited flexibility in trans-shipments 
- Fragmented cross-border services with delays at the frontiers (lack of 
interoperability) 
- Absence of cross-border cabotage 
- Lack of service integrators for optimised logistical chains 
- Traffic priorities allocated to passengers (unclear slot allocation 
management) 
- Lack of one-stop-shop in path allocation, cargo tracing and handling 
- lack of competition  
- non transparent cost structure on international corridors 
 
Most of the complaints about rail services concern the lack of competitive pressure and the 
fragmentation of the EU railway market. The current market structure for railway services is 
indeed characterised by incumbent railway undertakings operating national networks and a 
number of regional and/or specialised shippers. Also, costs are seen as very high, hindering the 
intermodal shift to rail.   
 
 
II -  Addressing the rail crisis by deep EU reforms 
The political agenda over the last decade has shifted towards encouraging a "revitalisation" of the 
railways as a transport option guaranteeing economic growth and sustainability. The rationale 
behind this reform consists of three objectives: 
 
1. fostering the competitiveness of the rail transport system in Europe, while contributing to the 
Union’s economic growth, and supporting and exploiting the internal market; 
2. fostering a pattern of sustainable mobility. 
3. reducing public expenditure  by inducing better  rail performance; 
 
 
2.1 Will revitalised railways guarantee economic performance? 
As in all utility sectors, among the main goals of railway reform is that of restoring 
competitiveness in the sector, in the form of reducing (X-) inefficiencies and introducing a higher 
degree of transparency in cost accounting as well as in business practices. Restoring 
competitiveness in the railways relies on two major intermediate targets: a) eliminating 
asymmetries vis-à-vis other transport sectors (thus, recapturing market share) through appropriate 
investment in necessary capacity and infrastructure and introducing a level-playing-field in 
access charging across modes; b) introducing reforms fostering liberalisation and competition 
where possible (so as to render the sector more efficient), and regulation where justified (thus, 
guaranteeing public service obligations and high safety standards). 
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As far as the first intermediate target is concerned, several studies have analysed whether a 
transport policy favouring railways (and waterway), is detrimental to economic growth or simply 
not coping with the current market requirements.  
In some cases4, these studies have come to the conclusion that -given existing economic trends- 
policies promoting environment-friendly modes of transport would slow down the economy. 
 
However, some other streams of research show -by using more systemic approaches - that a 
virtuous circle can be established inducing railways to react dynamically to a changed regulatory 
environment, thus capturing market share, improving performance and prompting economic 
development and transport sustainability. These studies find that "although the demand evolution 
is clearly tending towards increasing individuality and flexibility, there exist large and growing 
market segments for railway transport, in particular within and between large agglomerations as 
well as in long distance traffic along European corridors"5. For these market segments to be 
exploited fully (intermediate target b), organisational structures of the railway companies in 
Europe have to be changed substantially and innovative transport policies aimed at rebalancing 
the current situation need to be introduced. These policies would include the establishment of a 
level-playing field in infrastructure charging and a transfer of investment funding from less 
environment-friendly modes to more sustainable modes through taxation and access levies6. The 
overall belief is that "a consistent common transport policy, fostering rail and limiting the public 
support for road, after a period of adjustment, will end up in a higher acceptance of the rail 
mode7", thus reinforcing change. 
 
It has been also argued that when a coherent set of policies is established so as to promote 
investments in rail and raise their acceptance and performance, many regions will enjoy positive 
impacts8.  
 
2.2 Will railways deliver sustainability? 
A more efficient rail sector in a properly functioning internal market could contribute to alleviate 
problems of congestion and meet safety and environmental concerns. The IWW/INFRAS study 
(2000) calculated that external costs of transport have reached a level of 7.8% of EU GDP. These 
are associated with high-risk accidents, environmental damage and massive energy 
consumption9. The revitalisation of railways as an alternative transport mode to more polluting 
ones is deemed fundamental for the future of Transport in Europe10. Railways are seen as a 
valuable resource once efficient use is stimulated by market reforms. In this context, railways 
could potentially resume their traditional role of backbone high-density transport system. If these 
presumptions prove to be correct, railways could help a development towards sustainable 
transport growth, while actively contributing to a modal shift from road to rail. 
 
2.3 Reforming railways for the benefit of public budgets? 
                                                 
4  IAW (1997) or Baum (1997), quoted in Werner Rothengatter - Ibidem  
5   Rothengatter,  2001 
6  UNIFE, UIC, CER, UITP - Ibidem 
7  Rothengatter - Ibidem 
8  Rothengatter (Ibidem) calculated economic multipliers of investments in transport infrastructure with times horizons of 2016 and 2026 
showing positive economic impact of investment in rail as compared to road, once a consistent set of regulatory reforms and measures ensuring 
level-playing field across modes are introduced. -   One major development from the belief in the revitalisation of railways and their positive 
impact over the economy has been the High Level Group on the Trans-European Transport Network Report chaired by former Commissioner 
Karel Van Miert advising the European Commission to promote investment in railways in the revision of the TENs programmes. Its report was 
published on 27 June 2003. Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ten/transport/revision/hlg_en.htm 
9   UIC, UNIFE, CER, UITP , 2002. 
10  European Commission - White Paper on Transport Policy for 2010. Time to decide - COM (2001) 0370  
6  
The third reason that has prompted a thorough reform of railway regulation in Europe is the 
heavy financial burden of railways on public expenditures. It is estimated that railways subsidies 
are second only to expenses related to agricultural policy. 
 
A recent study for the European Commission11 has improved the quality of information on the 
estimated size and destination of public budget contributions to railways by country for the year 
2001.  The problems of comparability and sourcing have proved difficult to overcome. Part of 
this budget is provided to railways in the form of state aids12.  
 
The details of the public budget country data are not of concern for this paper. Public Service 
Obligations (=PSO) subsidies differ enormously between countries (even if corrected for country 
size) dependent on the definition of the PSO, the geography and relative density of the country 
and other factors. Infrastructure costs and investments make up a considerable share in most 
countries (with Italy as a high out-lyer with euro 5 billion), often 30 %-50 % or higher. Seven 
countries still engage in debt restructuring in 2001 (and France and Belgium in special pension 
obligations). 
 
The rationale for providing public support whether in the form of investment or state aids, is 
common to other utilities and is found in market failures or public service obligations (e.g. 
transport operators would provide only cherry-picking services if not funded in remote regions or 
via PSOs). These funds are also used to cover substantial investment costs (e.g. quality of 
infrastructure and safety), the private provision of which would not yield sufficient return on 
investment. State aids in the railway have an ambiguous effect on efficiency13. On the one hand 
state aids can induce an improvement of efficiency. On the other hand, if the intensity of state 
aids lowering operating costs, is too high, they will eventually reduce productive (or X-) 
efficiency by relieving operating costs. State aids are, therefore, best used when they catalyse 
private resources, when they are kept at low intensity levels and when they are combined with 
private funds while acting in a dynamic business environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  NERA - Study of the Financing of and Public Budget Contribution to Railways - December 2003 available on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/transport/rail/research/doc/nera2004-final.pdf 
12  Part of the public budget is declared as state aids. The magnitude of these aids is deemed to be around  €25 to€ 30 billion per year in the EU  
13  H.W. Friederiszick*, L.-H. Roller and C.C. Shultz, 2003 
Figure 2 - Public Budget 
Payments per traffic unit [passenger/tonne] 
(2001)1 
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The trend towards a rationalisation of public expenditures in railways is even better understood 
once due account is taken of the size of subsidies that national railways receive for the provision 
of required services.  This often hoovers between 50 % and 65 % of total turnover for passenger 
services. Hence, one observes a substantial pressure on governments to reduce budgetary 
expenditures, by seeking reforms promising to improve performance.  
 
Conscious of the huge amount of public funding for railway services, combined with the overall 
decline of railway market-share, European policy-makers have reconsidered the effectiveness of 
these expenditures and favour a radically new framework aimed at better utilisation of public 
money. (more ‘value for money’) 
 
Mixed results from early reformers (e.g. UK) induced the EU to pursue a step-by-step reform 
summarised as follows. 
 
  
The three steps of railway reform 
 
The European Commission has adopted a step-by-step approach, which has materialised through 
three stages of regulation and liberalisation. The first one has been established by Directive 
91/440 on the accounting separation between infrastructure and operations. This Directive was 
complemented by a follow-up in 1995 (Council Directive 95/18/EC) on the licensing of railway 
undertakings and one on allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges 
(95/19/EC). The follow-up was a timid attempt to introduce open access in the limited forms of 
international access through "international groupings" of railway undertakings (mainly 
incumbents).A second step of reforms at EU level, which entered into force on 15 March 2003, 
goes under the name of the First Railway Package . The first railway package, though only 
referring to rail freight, represents an attempt of liberalising the sector through the introduction of 
open access and forms of head-on competition at least on the TERFN (50% of EU railway 
networks and 80% of traffic) and later on the whole network (by 2006 according to the recently 
approved Second Railway Package). However, a number of technical directives had to be added 
so as to eliminate technical and legal barriers. This has been accomplished with the Directives on 
Interoperability of High-Speed (96/48) and Conventional rail (2001/16). A  third step of reforms 
was made with the second railway package (2004, see note 48): a directive for the harmonisation 
of safety requirements and certifications that are currently different in all Member States, and a 
regulation for the creation of a European Railway Agency for Safety and Interoperability (See 
Box 3). The completion of EU liberalisation and regulation is pursued with the  (pending) 
approval of the proposed third railway package that includes passenger service liberalisation by 
2010, harmonisation of train drivers' licenses, the inclusion of passenger rights requirements and 
freight service quality. 
 
 
III -   Market failures in European railways 
An economic analysis of the emerging EU railway services market has to begin with a proper 
understanding of three main characteristics: 
 
a. the multi-service / multi-purpose nature of railway in Europe, giving rise to significant 
economies of scale and scope; 
b. railway service provision is depending on the existence of a fixed, costly and very specific 
infrastructure giving rise to natural monopoly, because these costs are largely sunk; 
c. the existence of  numerous technical and legal barriers to entry. 
 
8  
These features discourage cost transparency and efficient allocation of resources, imply huge 
economies of scale and scope,  put a premium on coordination based on vertical integration while 
greatly reducing the room for competition in the sector.  We shall explain each characteristic 
briefly 
 
 
3.1 -  Economies of scope, and intermodality 
Railway service provision in Europe is characterised by its multi-product nature. The major 
business lines for the railways are sub-divided in two categories: 
 
a. Freight 
b. Passengers 
 
with a number of specific services.  The demarcation is often clear, although modest degrees of 
substitutability or complementarity can be found in the business lines listed in Table 3.   
 
In the freight domain, major business lines include the traditional transportation of bulky 
products (coal, raw materials, oil, chemicals, wood and derivatives, steel and metal profiles, cars 
and heavy machines).  Originally the core of railway services, increasing competition and 
substitutability from other modes (pipelines, waterways, road) have gradually reduced profit 
margins and market share. Possible inter-modal complementarity still exists and is encouraged. 
However, without proper business plans inter-modal competition or complementarity failed to 
deliver efficiency14. Even more problems arose in the area of parcel / small volumes (fast 
deliveries, food stock), where flexibility and tailor-made solutions for customers are important 
competitive requirements. Thus far, railways have, more often than not, failed to respond to such 
customer demands. Thus, a broad consensus has emerged that in such railway markets, the 
introduction of intra-modal competition (between different railway competitors) might prove 
useful to increase efficiency and customer satisfaction. 
 
In the passenger area, two major markets can be distinguished. On the one hand the long-distance 
services (intercity and high-speed services) with a degree of substitutability (hence competition) 
with other modes (road-air) and with some possibility to host degrees of intra-modal competition 
depending on the scale and density of the market. On the other hand, commuter line markets 
(urban and regional services) where a better complementarity with other modes of transport 
might result in sustainable solutions, but where intra-modal competition is likely to produce 
diseconomies of scale and scope. 
 
The complex web of services is also subject to substantial network effects that increase the value 
of services the more interconnections can be guaranteed across hubs. Therefore, the railway 
system does not escape the hubs-and-spokes architecture that is common to other transport 
networks. 
 
As we shall see, the fact that a complex bundle of services can be offered over the same network 
and potentially by the same companies has substantial implications for cost-accountancy, 
transparency and efficient functioning of railways. 
                                                 
14 "For a number of reasons, inter-modal competition is distorted and it does not exercise the same disciplinary force on the railway operator as 
competition within the same market. For instance, on the one hand, road transport is treated favourably in that at least part of the infrastructure 
is paid for by governments. On the other hand, given that they are permanently loss making, rail companies have a “soft budget constraint” as 
they can rely on being bailed out by the government".  See Stehmann (2001) 
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                                 Table 3 - Multi-product nature of railways 
 
 
Freight Transport  
Types of transport Substitutibility / 
Complementarity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network effects 
-  Bulk (coal, raw materials, oil, 
chemicals, wood and 
derivatives, steel and metal 
profiles, cars and heavy 
machines) 
§ Inter-modal substitutibility 
(pipelines, waterways, road) 
§ Possible inter-modal 
complementarity 
§ Intra-modal competition 
 
- Parcel/postal (small volumes, 
fast deliveries, food stock) 
- dedicated (food; foodstock) 
§ Inter-modal substitutibility 
(waterways, road) 
§ Intra-modal substitutibility 
 
Passenger Transport  
Types of transport Substitutibility / 
Complementarity  
 
- Long-distance  
§ Inter-city  
§ High-Speed 
Intra-modal substitutibility and 
inter-modal substitutibility 
(depending on elasticity to price 
and time) 
 
- Commuter rail 
§ Urban 
§ Sub-urban/regional 
 
Possible complementarity with 
other modes 
 
 
 
3.2 –  Sectoral Market failures in railways 
In discussing railways market failures in Europe it is necessary to distinguish market failures 
related to infrastructure,  and those of railways network services,  from the many entrenched 
barriers in the EU internal market (see 3.3) 
 
3.2.1 - Railway infrastructure as an essential facility  
High sunk costs for the establishment of a railway network result in the economic impossibility 
to duplicate or build alternative routes.  Current benchmarks suggest that 1 Km railway track is 
costing between €6 million and €10 million depending on topographical conditions.   The only 
case of railway network competition can be found on parallel routes in North America 
connecting the Eastern and Western Coasts whereby high capacity freight lines and large 
volumes seem to justify duplication.  As a rule, however, railway networks de facto compete 
with alternative modes of transport (road, sea-shipping, airlines and waterways networks). It is 
justified to consider infrastructure in railways as an essential facility for the performance of 
railway services15.  
                                                 
15  Essential Facility is a facility or infrastructure, which is necessary for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their 
business. A facility is essential if its duplication is impossible or extremely difficult due to physical, geographical, legal or economic 
constraints. Take for example a national electricity power grid used by various electricity producers to reach the final consumers: Since it 
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Costs of infrastructure amount to roughly 50 per cent of the railway business16. Duplication is not 
a reasonable economic option. Infrastructure managers in Europe spend annually around Euro 30 
billion for their roughly 200000 km railway infrastructure.  
   
A closer study of infrastructure shows immediately that one ought to take into account a range of 
characteristics and local or specific circumstances, before cost benchmarking is appropriate. 
First, one has to analyse the breakdown of overall costs into four cost categories.                               
 
a. Tracks 
b. Signalling systems (ground-based, visual, electronic systems and related equipment) 
c. Overhead electricity grid 
d. Stations and marshalling points 
 
The needs, hence costs, may differ per category, between countries, let alone continents, and 
depend (e.g.) on diversity, levels of safety and (desired) comfort; etc.. Second, the history, 
including depreciation of previous investments, of a network matters a great deal. The € 30 
billion annual spending is used (in varying degrees) for (a) construction (some € 10 billion) & 
mortgage, (b) maintenance some € 6-7 billion and (c) renewals. Third, the construction costs for 
railway infrastructure varies depending on topographical conditions and the nature of traffic that 
is going to be performed on the network. A network which is dedicated to freight with lower 
safety requirements than passenger networks and   little need for smooth travelling conditions is 
far less costly than a double service network (passenger and freight with different overlapping 
priority schemes as the European one), let alone a high-speed passenger network.  
 
Only when carefully considering all these characteristics and determinants, can infrastructure 
costs be usefully compared. The enormous variation in infrastructure costs between countries and 
(three) continents can be read from Box 1. It is mistaken to conclude from such cost 
discrepancies that infrastructure competition would be economically justified. At the same time, 
it does show the major difficulties for regulators or governments establishing proper minimum-
cost guidelines for infrastructure, and the access charges eventually derived from them. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote 15, continue) would not be viable for these producers to build their own distribution network, they depend on access to the existing 
infrastructure. Denying access to an essential facility may be considered an abuse of a dominant position by the entity controlling it, in 
particular where it prevents competition in a downstream market. (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/e_en.html#t69)     
16  According to Bente, 2003. 
11  
Box 1 - Benchmarking railway infrastructures 
 
In the following graph from the INFRACOST study17 a benchmark was performed across several 
infrastructures world wide (indicated by random letters for confidentiality purposes) in terms of 
annual costs for maintenance and renewal costs per track/km. 
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It can be noted that the European average cost for maintenance and renewals amounts to an annual 
average of €63800 per track/km compared to the very low €14600 per track/km in the US.  
The main reason for higher costs on infrastructure in the EU  consists in the double nature of 
performed traffic (freight and passengers) and the inevitably higher technical requirements for 
combining both services. Besides, those costs are also linked to heavier social and public service 
roles that European railways traditionally fulfil. The lower cost in the US networks is mainly due to 
the almost exclusive priority given to freight in comparison to passengers and the huge economies 
of scale and scope recouped over a continental network. Higher costs are shown in Asia including 
heavy renewal investments in developing countries and very costly but highly performing 
passenger dedicated networks in Japan.  
In most cases the variations around the average line are not only results of internal productivity or 
management choices, but also  follow from outsourcing of non-core activities and proper 
contractual schemes. 
  
 
3.2.2 -  Rail services and market failures  
We shall briefly point to network externalities, to economies of density, scale and scope, and to 
asymmetries of information. 
Railway services tend to be subject to economies of density. When holding the route system or 
kilometres of rail line constant, unit costs of rail services decline as output increases. Thus, the 
size of the firm has little to do with it: a small firm only serving one or a few routes with high 
traffic density might well have lower average costs than a large firm, running a network 
including lines with low density traffic. The sources of economies of density are usually two: 
declining average capital costs per unit of service (with high turnover) and a fall in unit operating 
costs per route-kilometre (maintenance of way and of rolling stock, fuel and crew) with high 
                                                 
17  UIC INFRACOST - Improved Performance of Infrastructure by Benchmarking the Infrastructure Costs – Union Internationale de Chemin de 
Fer (UIC), 2001 
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turnover. In the extreme a route might become a ‘natural monopoly’, that is, it is cost-minimising 
if only a single firm serves it. Moreover, if high-density tracks are doubled, capacity substantially 
more than doubles and if traffic demand is high enough, the average costs of such a route are 
likely to fall. A similar cost-reducing effect (in passenger services) might be expected if double-
deck trains replace ordinary trains, even if quality is likely to improve, in turn attracting even 
more traffic. 
 
The existence of indivisibilities in inputs and outputs makes the expansion of networks and 
services for the railway industry efficient only if performed in absolute discrete order. Capital 
units (tracks, stations) can only be expanded in discrete, indivisible increments, while demand 
fluctuates marginally in much smaller units. Consequently, increases (decreases) in supply can 
exceed increases (decreases) in demand, resulting in excess or shortage of capacity on specific 
routes.  
 
The expansion of a specific route adds value to the network only over distances of substantial 
lengths (e.g. 100-200km, unless smaller feeder lines are at stake)18.  
 
"This feature has several important implications for investment and pricing. The transportation 
costs of an additional unit of traffic (freight or passengers) may be insignificant when capacity is 
idle, but they may become substantial when the capital is being used to its fullest".19  
 
Further difficulties of marginally allocating costs to specific businesses, services or investments 
are linked to the costs and management of infrastructure maintenance and renewal. Especially 
renewal is very rarely done on the overall length of lines. This phenomenon, caused by the high 
burden of costs for renewal, leads to complications for the system by accumulating several layers 
of technological solutions, in turn increasing the level of sunk costs involved in the 
infrastructure. 
 
These structural characteristics (network effects, high sunk costs, density effects) require 
appropriate regulation, incentive schemes and performance monitoring. Needless to say this is far 
from easy as sections 4 and 5 will show. 
 
One of the major features for railway infrastructure is the high ratio of fixed to marginal costs. 
According to studies and industry sources fixed costs for infrastructure account on average for 
about 90 per cent of total infrastructure costs as reflected in average access fee structure.20 
 
This implies that:  
- huge economies of scale are needed so as to recover costs efficiently (hence,  for 
principal lines, this might serve as an argument to enlarge the scale of existing 
network operations through a pan-European dimension and the Trans-European 
Networks for rail) 
- a certain degree of cross-subsidisation of routes could occur unless specific 
contracts are  concluded for services of general interest or  
- that a certain level of subsidy will also be needed for PSOs. 
 
This has several implications from a regulatory and economic point of view. It  may prompt 
understandable questions about privatisation and liberalisation of such a monopoly’s  very 
                                                 
18  This is also true for train-sets. Train-sets' capacity can only be increased on discrete units (by adding an entire wagon or coach) and not 
marginally. 
19  Campos and Cantos,  June 2000 (14721) p. 211 
20  Campos and Cantos - Ibidem 
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intrusive regulation. For instance in a principal/agent theoretical setting, one could argue what is 
the real meaning of privatising such a monopoly if it has to be heavily regulated in terms of 
safety and price caps and what is the role of the owner not being free of charging for his/her 
assets and combining his/her assets in the most appropriate way for profit maximisation (see also 
further) 
 
Asymmetric information21  may hit rail consumers as well as rail regulators The latter refers to 
the way cost accountancy is performed, thus, the  risks of heavy cross-subsidisation given the 
traditionally integrated nature of networks and services. As we shall see, this has implications 
when attempts of separating infrastructures and operations are made. The technical complexities 
of the system and the management culture creates further hindrances to overcome the market 
failure.  Full clarity is required, however, since separation of infrastructure from rail operations is 
known to cause considerable coordination failures. It is said that that due to knowledge 
accumulation and safety concerns, railways would be better managed through a single vertically 
integrated company embracing the overall value chain. 
But full integration would have the effect of foreclosing competition in services. Only by 
overcoming asymmetries of information can one properly assess the costs and benefits of 
competitive options for reform. 
 
In the following table 4, a summary of market failures and intrinsic features of the railway 
system is presented. 
 
Table 4 - Features and Market Failures of Railway Systems 
 
Railway System  
Features and Market failures 
Typology Effects 
Natural Monopoly 
(essential facility) 
High Sunk Costs in Infrastructure – 
Construction 
§ Non-duplication of infrastructure 
§ Non-competition among 
infrastructures (safe North America) 
§ If vertically controlled, risk of 
barrier to entry 
 
 High Maintenance Costs § Costs have long-run perspective 
 Renewal Costs § Renewal in discrete units 
§ Possible complication of the system 
Network Externalities and 
density affects 
Positive network externalities § Value increases with increase of 
routes length 
§ Doubling infrastructure substantially 
more than doubles capacity 
 Asset indivisibility § Positive externalities in the value of 
carrying extra units of transport 
§ Negative externalities in non 
marginal adjustments of supply and 
demand (non Marginal adaptability 
of capacity) 
§ Excess capacity OR Bottlenecks 
Public good 
 
Safety aspects 
 
§ Widespread benefit / non-marginal 
cost allocation 
                                                 
21  Asymmetric information refers to costs and benefits of a transaction that the parties to the transaction have not accounted for in the terms of 
exchange. It is about  disparities in information customers and suppliers have concerning the quality, the price/quality combination  and the 
characteristics of the exchanged good or service. The less informed party will make suboptional choices, which results in an inefficient 
market allocation. Regulation  may help if  it obliges companies to publicly assess the quality and features of their products and to comply 
with some basic requirements. Asymmetric information also exists between the regulator and the regulated (the railway company), especially 
as to costs.   
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Public good (continue) Safety aspects (continue) 
 
 
Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
§ Essential requirement. Acceptance 
of risks. Heavy technological burden 
for risk reduction 
§ non-appropriability and non-
excludability (of consumption) 
Economies of scale and scope High level of fixed costs to total costs 
(roughly 90%) of infrastructure. 
Average cost curves flat on high 
volumes. 
§ Fewness of market players 
§ Monopolistic behaviour 
§ Difficult entry into market 
§ Inflexibility  
Asymmetric information Presence of high share of common 
costs. 
Difficulty to assess “true costs”. 
Knowledge accumulation in the sector. 
§ Difficult cost apportionment  
§ Possible regulatory capture 
 
 
3.3 Additional Failures  of the EU Internal Rail Market 
Traditional railway undertakings have also enjoyed a monopoly position in the EU, because of 
existing high technical and legal barriers to entry.  If such barriers were to persist they would 
greatly strengthen market power in a liberalised environment. 
We shall briefly discuss  six barriers.  
 
3.3.1 Fragmented license scheme 
Up to date about 360 railway licenses have been issued in the EU1522. Until the 
implementation of the first railway package, the only licensed railway undertakings for 
trans-European services were the incumbent national operators. Their operations on a cross-
border basis were guaranteed by contracts resembling “bilateral agreements” in the airline 
sector or through the setting up of international consortia of national operators. The quoted 
directives23 introduced in several steps a scheme whereby National Rail Regulatory 
Authorities release (freight) licenses which provide for the right to operate within the 
TERFN (Second Railway Package) and on the overall EU network with the possibility of 
cabotage (Third Railway Package, not yet adopted). Licenses are issued on the basis of 
professional, financial and safety related records of the licensee. However, once given, a 
license does not automatically lead to entry. Especially disparate safety rules and cultures 
may represent a hindrance to entry. Also fears are expressed in public hearings and 
publications24  about issuing bodies being captured by existing railway undertakings. 
  
3.3.2 Lack of interoperability 
Interoperability refers to the ability of any railway undertakings to run their vehicles on any 
part of the European Railway network seamlessly. Existing railway networks were 
designed so as to satisfy national transportation needs.  The upshot at the EU level is a 
patchwork of national systems, in turn increasing complexities and costs for seamless 
operations. Differences include: gauge width, electrical voltages, signalling systems, 
platform dimensions, loading parameters, operational rules and training. Directives 
96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC respectively for high-speed and conventional rail networks have 
established a regulatory framework for the harmonisation of technical rules. Industry 
estimates reckon  that total cost savings due to fully-fledged interoperability and a higher 
degree of technical harmonisation  could be in the order of 30-40 per cent on the total value 
                                                 
22 European Commission – DG TREN - http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/rail/countries/be/licence_en.htm. Some of the mentioned licenses also 
include urban, passenger and regional rail licenses. 
23   Esp. Directive 2001/13/EC 
24  Claeys, Santini & Vergamini, 2002  
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chain costs (equipment, operations, maintenance)25. These huge gains will thus greatly 
facilitate the exploitation of the internal rail market26. 
 
3.3.3 Train drivers licenses 
The Commission has recently proposed mutual recognition of train driver’s licenses and 
the establishment of common training patterns 27.  In the EU-15 there are 200 000 train 
drivers. 
 
3.3.4 Locomotives and absence of leasing  
There are a number of shippers that privately own freight wagons. However, they never 
competed with the established railway undertakings, since they had to use the incumbents’ 
traction for providing shipment services. Traction is essential for the provision of railway 
services. It is provided in the form of railway locomotives whose purchase cost can be 
relatively high for a new entrant. Helped by ongoing technical harmonisation, - and despite 
some weaknesses in the leasing markets - interoperable locomotives are being increasingly 
leased from suppliers (Alstom Transport, Bombardier Transportation, Siemens 
Transportation, General Motors, General Electric) or from emerging rolling stock under 
availability contracts (HSBC Rail, Angel Trains etc.). However, at present, the market for 
leasing is still crippled by the lack of technical interoperability of locomotives and the need 
for multiple conformity assessment that reduces the opportunities from reselling the 
equipment in second-hand markets. Suitable second-hand locomotives are often not 
available28. The purchase of a second hand locomotive from a foreign undertaking does not 
offer an option as the procedure to adapt the locomotive to the national technical standards 
and to obtain a “general admission” would cost almost as much as the locomotive itself. 
New locomotives are prohibitively expensive for a new entrant29.  
3.3.5  Priority allocation and safety systems 
The European conventional railway system –with the exception of dedicated high-speed 
rail for passengers- is characterised by a dual use (for both passengers and freight). 
According to the principle that “passengers vote, goods don’t”, one of the major challenges 
for the revitalisation of freight transport on rail is finding the right priority allocation 
schemes in a plethora of multi-purpose services. Rail freight is often subject to a “second 
priority” allocation in slots on a national basis. One of the major challenges (to be 
addressed by the RailNet Europe initiative) is to improve the coordination of national 
infrastructure managers so as to provide for necessary train paths in a “one-stop-shop” 
logic. This procedure is combined with the possibility of monitoring train path allocation 
                                                 
25  UNIFE - 2000 
26  A technological revolution in railway interoperability could be unleashed through the progressive instalment of ERTMS (European Railway 
Traffic Management System) that would allow for a common signalling and communication protocol, thus saving high costs in multi-
signalling locomotives and increasing capacity on the network by 30 per cent. ERTMS is a European effort that parallels similar attempts to 
interface communication systems such as GSM (there is also a GSM application for rail GSM-R), Galileo and Eurocontrol. ERTMS and its 
different levels of integration could allow for automatic translations of ground-based radio signals and for automatic train control (safety 
braking, track clearance, dispatching) while carrying secondary information packages for tracing and tracking and providing for added value 
services for freight and passengers . Sources: Strategic Railway Research Agenda, ERRAC (European Rail Research Advisory Council), 
2003; UNIFE, 2000 ; UNISIG (Grouping of European Railway Signaling Companies and developers of ERTMS)  
 27  Together with proposed regulations, forms of [0]self-regulatory approaches are also introduced (e.g. in operational rules) 
28  For instance, most second hand locomotives only have Diesel engines. Such engines cannot be used for passenger transport as they cannot 
provide electricity for air-condition and heating. 
29  "Since locomotives have very high fixed cost, their acquisition makes economic sense only if the railway undertaking can benefit from 
economies of scale, i.e. if it can provide a sufficient number of services. Given the need for a back-up service in the case of repair, railway 
companies operate with a pool of locomotives. Such a pool offers the necessary flexibility to obtain a locomotive on short notice if a new 
service has to be provided. It also reduces significantly the overall cost of locomotives left idle to provide back-up. A company which operates 
a pool of locomotives may need 5 locomotives to provide back-up for 50 locomotives in operation. Thus, about 10 per cent of locomotives 
would be out of use. A new entrant which at the beginning operates only on one route would need one locomotive to operate and another one to 
provide the back-up. Thus, in its case 50 per cent of its investment into locomotives would remain idle. Similar reasoning applies as well to 
drivers. Thus, given important economies of scale in the railway sector, until they have reached a “critical mass” of services, new entrants 
depend on obtaining traction elsewhere". Stehmann - Ibidem. 
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following the potential capability identified in Network Statements. Such statements are 
compulsory under DIR 2001/14 and available for new entrants, too. 
 
3.3.6  Hindrances to cabotage 
Cabotage is the transport of goods or people wholly within one country by operators 
established in another country. This would allow domestic services performed by a foreign 
operator and would imply competitive pressure, presumably leading to higher efficiency of 
rail transport.  Full cabotage was allowed for road haulage from 1 July 1998. After 
cabotage services emerged in road haulage, the sector reorganised itself  to capture all 
possible goods flows over Europe, thus optimising capacity utilisation to the full.  Nothing 
like this is yet happening  in rail.  It is said that almost 50 per cent of freight wagons are 
travelling empty with major economic losses and inefficiencies for the final user. The 
absence of cabotage is due to technical reasons (weakness in track and tracing solutions) 
and non-competitive practices. 
 
Until these barriers are removed, entry costs for competitive service providers will remain high 
and final consumers will not often consider rail services as ‘value for money’.   As a result, rail 
freight will not be able to recapture original market share, leaving goods traffic to be performed 
first and foremost by the direct competitor (road haulage). 
 
IV -  Regulatory reform I: vertical separation and pricing options 
Not unlike in other network industries (Pelkmans, 2001b), vertical separation or unbundling was 
viewed by many as an inevitable first step of reforms pursuing greater efficiency. Vertical 
separation was deemed necessary to discover the “true” costs of running the railway business and 
the “necessary” subsidy level to allow safe and reliable infrastructure. By allowing for vertical 
separation, subsidisation between networks and operations should become clear thanks to cost 
transparency for incumbents. Removing and preventing cross-subsidisation, in turn, creates fair 
conditions for potential entrants.  Ideally, too, vertical separation helps reducing the asymmetries 
of information in the railway business, traditionally prone to hide cost structures and discourage 
performance. Table 5 summarises the types of asymmetries of information that are expected to be 
reduced or overcome by introducing vertical separation. 
 
Table 5- Typical asymmetries of information in the railway business 
 
Asymmetries of information Infrastructure Service provision 
Cost accountancy - Cross-subsidisation between 
infrastructure and operation 
- Cross-subsidisation between 
highly and scarcely used 
routes 
- Lack of knowledge of asset 
values and cost structure 
- Rent-seeking [positions] 
- Multi-part access tariff 
- Cross–subsidisation between 
passenger and freight services 
- Cross-subsidisation between 
services based on PSOs and 
commercial services 
- “appropriate” marginal cost 
pricing 
 
Knowledge accumulation - Highly concentrated 
knowledge controlled by 
incumbents can impede entry  
- Possible regulatory capture 
(e.g. in issuing access rights) 
- Highly concentrated 
knowledge of the system in the 
hands of incumbents 
- Possible Regulatory capture of 
railway bodies in issuing 
licensing 
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4.1 - Introducing vertical separation and service unbundling 
Opting for the separation of rail infrastructure from  services has been controversial and, as 
experience shows, has not led to clear-cut conclusions. The railway sector, with its web of 
technological legacies and inter-dependencies, and given large economies of scope, can make a 
powerful case for tight coordination of its components (not least in the safety area!). Outside 
Europe, railway systems have opted for a structure whereby dominant operators also retain the 
control over infrastructure and separately charge for the “incremental users” (new entrants). This 
is the case for Amtrak (US), Via Rail (Canada) and the Japan Rail Freight Corporation.  
 
In principle, the system might work effectively if fair conditions are applied to incremental users 
and if investment plans of the incumbents also include new entrants’ needs.  As Thompson (200) 
puts it: "There are benefits to having the dominant user retain control over infrastructure.  First, the performance of 
the incremental users [new entrants] is clarified and, assuming reasonable access fees, their operations strengthened.  
Second, the potential risk of disruption due to coordination problems between infrastructure provider and dominant 
operator is reduced  – important when the dominant operator plays a significant role in the country’s transport.  
Moreover, the infrastructure investment program can potentially be better coordinated with the primary user.  The 
disadvantage is that the incremental operators [new entrants] may not be fully integrated into investment planning, 
and they survive at the (sometimes questionable) mercy of the dominant operator – risking reduced service 
reliability, increased costs and possible safety hazards for the incremental operators". 
Of course, how exactly the latter has to be operationalised, is far from easy to answer. The 
system might fail however, once the market is fragmented along national borders, when it is too 
small to allow for –at least- fringe competition and if access fees are imposed with unfair 
conditions. 
Through Directives 91/440/EC and 14/2001, the EU introduced and reinforced the principle of 
separation between infrastructure and operations. The EU directives oblige national railway 
systems to implement vertical unbundling. This unbundling requires separate companies 
(Germany, Italy, France), but not necessarily separate ownership (UK and Sweden). Whether this  
choice implies gains depends on whether allocational economies from independent control of 
access  are larger than infrastructure economies of scope deriving from vertically managing a 
system that has grown complex over the last two centuries.30 The drive towards unbundling in 
the EU is meant to enable full transparancy and understanding of the following cost lines: 
 
- costs related to public services obligations 
- sunk costs for construction of infrastructure 
- costs for maintenance31 
- costs of infrastructure management and paths allocation 
 
These costs include a fixed component independent from the provision of services and associated 
with the mere existence of infrastructure (construction, preservation, amortisation costs) and a 
variable component that is linked to the provision of services and is incremental with the extra 
units of service provided (e.g. adding a new end-to-end freight haul will require some extra 
labour force, marshalling facilities and storage, handling machines utilisation, energy etc.). It is 
estimated that the variable component only accounts for about 9 per cent of total costs32. The 
other costs are of a fixed nature and refer to accumulated investments, necessary renewals and 
maintenance discounted over time. 
 
                                                 
30 Joy, 2002  
31  Maintenance services are still mainly in the hands of national railway incumbent and on safety and business grounds, national maintenance 
markets tend to be heavily protected with the outsourcing on a European scale, thus increasing costs and reducing opportunities for business 
optimisation on a larger scale. 
32  Javier Campos and Pedro Cantos - Ibidem 
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The multipurpose-multiservice nature of railways does not allow to precisely  allocate all costs to 
services generating them, because  railway infrastructure  generates a large share of common 
costs throughout the service chain.  
 
The fact that most railway costs are common costs and have a major fixed nature has important 
implications  for the structure of the railway industry and performance. 
 
As far as the structure is concerned, the following aspects are at stake:  
 
1. Large economies of scale 
The fact that railways score high fixed costs and that variable costs are only a small portion 
of total costs, identifies an average cost curve that is flat towards high volumes of traffic33. 
It also implies that decisions are taken on the basis of a long-run marginal cost curve, since 
a short-run marginal cost will never appropriately capture the apportionment of common 
costs  for specific services34 
 
2. Few market players 
The fact that costs can only be recouped on the basis of very large traffic volumes or long 
routes, implies that the number of players in the operations and even more so in 
infrastructure management, will be limited 
 
3. Pricing will be above marginal costs 
Given large economies of scale, price will not be set at the level of marginal costs, but at a 
higher level, [thus possibly leading to monopolistic behaviour]. However, how to determine 
mark-ups is crucial for efficiency and cost-recovering (see further). 
 
4. A certain degree of cross-subsidisation of services and routes will always occur 
The fact that costs are  largely common to a plethora of services and business lines, that the  
overwhelming part of the cost are fixed and that economies of scale can only be fully 
exploited with  large traffic volumes, render a certain degree of cross-subsidisation  
between services and/or between assets unavoidable. Even   strict accounting rules for the 
separation of accounts among the major business lines are unlikely to be sufficient to 
prevent this entirely. 
 
5.  As soon as market forces are more prevalent in rail, focus will shift to high-density corridors  
while closing low density routes (unless used for niche purposes. 
Given the nature of costs (most of them fixed and common), the only way to improve the 
performance of railways from a cost perspective under competitive operations in 
contestable markets (where large scale/high volumes allow for that) is the closure or 
outright subsidisation through PSOs of low density routes. The reason is that the fixed costs 
of such routes add to fixed cost formation elsewhere in the network and produce a financial 
burden on the performance of potentially contestable high density segments.35  
 
In terms of performance, the intrinsic characteristics of the railway and its cost rigidities at the 
level of assets (especially infrastructure) generate the following effects: 
 
1. High degree of economic inflexibility and limited capacity to change and adapt. 
                                                 
33. Kessides & . Willig, 1998, Annex 1 
34  It is  however difficult to identify long-run marginal costs, i.e.  what type of investment and renewal costs they might include and how to 
apportion them to the specific costs of running an extra service (or unit of service) or how to discount them.. Kessides & Willig - Ibidem 
35 Kessides &  Willig, 1998,  
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Significant adjustments or reductions in costs are hardly linked to variable assets/costs but 
mainly to fixed assets and can only be achieved by lines closure or business outsourcing. 
 
2. Pricing services according to marginal costs will be arbitrary, given their common nature 
and the impossibility to apportion them correctly to lines of business.  Marginal costs (long 
run) setting requires some kind of ‘fully distributed cost’ rule, whether based on the relative 
output method (e.g. distributing common costs over all services according to gross ton-
miles), the attributable cost rule (according to a key based on directly attributable costs) or 
the gross-revenue approach (e.g. overhead costs between freight and passenger). But long-run 
marginal costs obtained this way, may well be too high or too low, given demand and 
intermodal competition. If too high, traffic demand for service k1, will fall, hence, cost 
recovery will not work; if too low, demand for service k2 will rise, but there is no way of 
knowing whether this will help cost recovery enough, and whether service k2 can be 
expanded rapidly. Indeed, such arbitrary (long run) marginal costs can only be afforded by 
firms not actively responding or interacting with demand. As Kessides & Willig (1998) argue 
36, it will also be sub-optimal for three reasons: 
 
a. charging will occur at the level where price is higher than marginal costs, hence,  
generating a deadweight loss (monopolistic behaviour) 
 
b. marginal costs will be supply-driven and not optimised according to market-
driven demand if not accompanied by competition.  Thus, decision-making on 
charging rates will incorporate necessary and unnecessary costs. If the 
infrastructure manager can afford not to be sensitive to costs, marginal cost 
recovery will hinder efficient charging by incorporating inefficient practices such 
as:  
i. possible inefficiency in the field of maintenance (e.g. over-staffing);  
ii. inefficiency in the allocation of excess capacity (sub-optimal 
utilisation of capacity); 
iii. inefficiency in the procurement of infrastructure renewals (e.g. sub-
optimal procurement policy, fragmented procurement market) 
 
c. The temptation to explicitly cross subsidise services and routes will always remain 
given the common nature of costs and the difficulties in apportioning them to 
specific services. 
 
 
4.2 Vertical separation and cost transparency 
A major reason for the choice of vertical separation in Europe is the expected  improvement of 
cost transparency and predictability. 
 In turn, this facilitates competitive entry (by pre-empting cross-subsidisation) and creates 
incentives for  
1. efficient cost recovery; 
2. improving capacity allocation and responding to users needs; 
3. maximising cost-recovery for use of infrastructure,  
which all imply considerable economic gains. 
 
                                                 
36 Ioannis N. Kessides, Robert D. Willig - Ibidem 
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4.2.1 Efficient cost recovery 
As noted, the high degree of common costs in the railway business might entail a high degree of 
cross-subsidisation if appropriate accounting separation is not in place.  It is one thing to say that 
cross-subsidisation can never be fully prevented in railways, given that common (and fixed) costs 
are so high (see section 4.1), it is quite another to allow just any form of explicit or implicit 
cross-subsidisation to occur, with the lack of information, discipline and incentives which result! 
Economic theory requires that at least the incremental costs the activity imposes on total costs be 
charged to the business as a cost.  If the business would not pay the incremental costs it would 
amount to a cross-subsidy37.  
 
Directive 91/440 introduces separation of accounts between infrastructure and operations. 
Directive 2001/12 goes further in requiring that railways also keep separate accounts  
(horizontally) for passenger and freight services. The latter Directive requires that funds paid for 
activities related to the provision of passenger services as public services must be shown 
separately in the accounts and may not be transferred to activities related to the provision of other 
transport services or any other business. 
Forcing out cross-subsidisation as much as possible brings out in the open all sources of cost 
generation, failures and responsibility in the management of services.  This creates incentives for 
good management: having identified the real sources of costs, a business entity would be able to 
minimise that source, eliminate practices  which inflate costs, invest in innovative technologies 
aiming at reducing costs.  Following the discovery of the "true" costs of providing a service [or at 
least, the discovery of what costs are excessive or a waste], optimal management decisions 
focusing on core activities or proper outsourcing of non-core business would  be much more 
likely to come about.  
 
4.2.2 Improving capacity allocation and responding to users needs 
The second reason for vertically separating infrastructure from operations consists of fostering 
competition. The EU view reflected in the said directives suggests that a vertically integrated 
railway company would be a major obstacle for competition in service provision: incumbent 
operators would be preferred to new entrants in case of path allocation. Besides being a barrier to 
entry for newcomers, a vertically integrated railway will be prone not to respond to market needs 
when faced with requests for capacity.  Furthermore, internal managerial frictions, rigid structure 
and non-market sensitive procedures could frustrate the optimal allocation of capacity requested 
by shippers or final users.  
 
A vertically separated infrastructure manager using demand-sensitive tariffication schemes (see 
§4.2.3), could better allocate capacity by tailoring prices according to scarcity and usage of 
infrastructure.  Doing so should optimise performance and capacity utilisation.  On the other 
hand, a better tariffication responding to market conditions would be beneficial over the railway 
value-chain down to all final users (shippers, logistical operators, transport integrators) and final 
consumers.  
 
Vertical separation will also be beneficial in that all infrastructure users face the same treatment 
and system of  access pricing. 
 
                                                 
37 NERA – Ibidem  
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4.2.3  Maximising cost-recovery for use of infrastructure though proper infrastructure charging 
The vertical unbundling of infrastructure and operations creates separate infrastructure managers 
who will have to charge operators access fees. These fees being set independently from the 
incumbent operator, new entrants and the incumbent will face the same treatment. Different 
methodologies have been put forward so as to maximise the cost recovery for the use of railway 
infrastructure: a. linear single tariff, b. Ramsey pricing, c. Marginal cost tariff. 
The first access charging system is relatively easy to understand and apply, since it is based on 
linear fees imposed according to tonnes/km or passenger/km. However, this system does not 
allow for marginally and transparently accounting the external costs (environmental impact, 
noise, maintenance costs, congestion and scarcity costs). 
Ramsey pricing is rather more sophisticated. It “leads to demand differentiated prices (…), which 
apportion all unattributable fixed and common costs of the railroad among its services on the 
basis of the values of those services to consumers, mathematically expressed as their elasticities 
of demand. By providing that each service is priced at a markup over marginal costs, which is 
inversely related to the elasticity of demand for that service, economically efficient differential 
pricing combines cost and demand factors in an optimal manner. These principles result in lower 
prices for shippers generally by establishing a set of rates which encourages the purchase of more 
rail transportation services by more shippers than artificial fully distributed cost based pricing, 
thereby creating a larger traffic base over which unattributable costs can be apportioned. Ramsey 
pricing maximizes the opportunity for rail carriers to earn an adequate rate of return on capital, 
and they foster innovation and efficiency in the provision of rail transportation services by 
rewarding carriers who achieve cost reductions”38. However, the application of this charging 
scheme would be rather difficult. It would require the precise knowledge of scarcity on specific 
networks39 and complex models and parameters to calculate the social benefits of alternative uses 
of the slots (including opportunity costs for delays, congestion, choice of alternative modes). 
However, if there were sufficient intermodal and perhaps intra-model competition, a combination 
of (unregulated) Ramsey pricing and price-ceilings based on stand-alone-costs is likely to be 
optimal. Incentives for rail companies to adopt Ramsey pricing – with ceilings to protect captive 
shippers – are strong. For elaboration, see op.cit., Kessides & Willig, pp. 12/13. 
The EU in Directive 2001/14 opts for the application of marginal cost principles - the third 
access pricing system - whereby charges are based on the "cost that is directly incurred as a result 
of operating the train service". Charges would be added to the single linear tariff, the marginal 
utilisation costs of the network, thus including as well parameters such as scarcity of capacity, 
external costs (noise, CO2 emissions, potential accidents) and marginally attributed maintenance 
costs. This tariffication system would help solving excess capacity problems and optimising 
infrastructure management practices, although it is likely to be complicated, and almost certainly 
provides too much national discretion.  
However, as C.A. Nash (2001) noticed, the multi-part tariff without transparent and appropriate 
state subsidies would result into a barrier to entry for new competitors. “The problem here is that 
the marginal cost of additional train paths is typically well below average cost, even when 
allowance for congestion and scarcity costs is included. The result is that efficient pricing 
requires government subsidies. If they are not forthcoming, then the second-best solution is 
almost certainly a two-part tariff, since this leaves the train operator free to recover the fixed 
                                                 
38  Kessides, Ibidem 
39 " Capacity utilisation is measured by the number of train services operated, as a proportion of the maximum number of train services which 
could be operated without congestion, given the infrastructure and signalling systems. However, rail capacity cannot be unambiguously defined 
as it depends on the pattern of train services on a section of track, particularly the relative speeds of trains and the number of stops, and the 
infrastructure manager’s flexibility to adjust train times. The difficulty in clearly defining rail capacity is a key barrier to designing means of 
dealing with rail scarcity and congestion". C.A. Nash,  B. Matthews -  2003 
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element from final consumers in the most efficient way possible. However, two-part tariffs are a 
barrier to entry, since the new entrant almost inevitably ends up either paying a higher marginal 
charge per train kilometre, or a fixed charge that is much higher relative to the level of their 
business. In Germany for instance they have recently been found to be illegal. Any alternative 
which is non-discriminatory is likely to involve a high charge per train kilometre which is well 
above marginal cost and which therefore greatly restricts the growth of the industry” 40. 
In line with these concerns, Directive 2001/14 does allow for a certain degree of flexibility where 
it states that national infrastructure managers’ are required to charge capacity and perform 
allocation procedures in a fair manner. It shall also provide infrastructure managers and train 
operators with appropriate incentives and to provide for flexibility in capacity allocation41. 
However, this flexibility will entail too much discretion in the interpretation and application of 
the Directive's requirements, with fragmentation and less competitive entry as a result. 
 
4.3 - The recent EU approach to vertical separation 
Directive 2001/14 on allocation of capacity and charging is a revision of Directive 95/19. The 
new Directive also contains the following requirements: 
§ allocation of infrastructure capacity is managed by an entity which is independent  
from  any railway undertaking, as follows; 
§ infrastructure managers when full separation between infrastructure and 
operations has been achieved; ; 
§ an independently accountable entity of the incumbent when separation 
had not been opted for; 
§ allocation of infrastructure capacity is performed under fair conditions; 
§ obligation for Member States and infrastructure managers to publish clear 
information about their networks and the technical aspects thereof. This 
information is contained in so-called Network Statements and is necessary for any 
railway undertakings so as to evaluate the necessary technical, physical and 
business aspects to be considered while entering into the markets of  other 
countries. The  significance of Network Statements goes far beyond the meaning 
of the Directive since it provides: 
1. necessary technical information which is at the basis of future 
harmonisation of operating rules, improved technical 
standardisation, establishment of cost-effective migration towards 
uniform technical and operating systems (interoperability aspects); 
2. natural benchmarks for best practices in technical and managerial 
aspects of the networks hopefully  prompting emulation among 
networks regulators with no harm to safety42. 
                                                 
40  Nash - 2001  
41 Nash – Ibidem 
42  Safety aspects are considered in a Directive on Railway Safety (See note 48). Safety aspects are  critical to any railway network and high 
standards of safety are adopted within the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) which are mandatory  following the Railway 
Interoperability Directives for high-speed and conventional rail 96/48 and 2001/16 
Box 2 - " EU-wide cooperation among rail regulators :  
 the Safety Agency  & RailNETEurope" 
 
In EU network markets, the internal market requires cross-border liberalisation, competition (where 
economically sensible) and regulation. However, the EU (sticking to the old and probably now dysfunctional 
Meroni doctrine of 1958, forbidding independent EU regulatory agencies) has not established regulatory 
agencies. Nevertheless, coordination across borders is indispensable in most if not all network industries, 
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- infrastructure managers could face  conflicting interests in allocating paths according to 
priority needs: 
§ priority between passengers and freight trains; 
§ priority between international and national track usage. 
 
This situation could lead to conflicts and sub-optimal allocation.  
 
On 24 September 2002, rail infrastructure managers from 16 European countries (EU15 except for Ireland 
and Greece, plus Norway, Hungary and Switzerland) established  RailNet Europe to improve the 
international coordination of train paths and timetables through the progressive introduction of “one-stop-
shops”. RailNet Europe builds on the experience gained since 1998 on two rail freight corridors 
(BELIFRET from Belgium to Italy and Spain and the North-South Freight Freeways linking the Nordic 
countries, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Austria). These experiences will further extend to other 
instances financed by the EU 6th Framework Programme for Research. Not unlike the Florence Forum 
(electricity) the coordination will be closely linked to infrastructure charging.   
 
While, on economic terms, the voluntary effort of RailNet Europe seems to have gained grounds, on 
technical terms, a Single European Railway Area, including the establishment of a fully-fledged Internal 
Market for railway services and equipment, requires sufficiently uniform and coherent rules for rail 
safety and interoperability as well.  
 
The need for a European Agency for Rail Safety and Interoperability43 arises from the magnitude, the 
scope and the nature of the problems that the rail mode might face in a liberalised business environment 
with a pan-European dimension. The mere availability of safety rules and interoperability directives is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for seamless cross-border rail services in the Internal Market. In the 
light of art. 5, EC, on Subsidiarity,44 the foreseen agency might be justified for reasons of scope, scale and 
cross-border externalities.  
 
The rationale for the agency  lies in the possible “coordination failure” that national safety bodies might  
suffer from in matters such as: 
· Accident investigations 
· Common safety targets 
· Common safety methods 
· Assessment of interoperability requirements 
  
The proportionality  (last sentence in art. 5, EC) is ensured by the fact that the agency proposes remedies to 
the European Commission and the Council of Ministers (therefore, any decision becomes politically 
accountable and finally lies in the interplay between the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers 
where Member States positions are voiced). 
 
                                                 
43 See footnote 22 
44 The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
Meroni or not. Several network markets have set up cooperative structures and/or  'autonomous' agencies 
(e.g. in electricity, gas, telecoms and airlines)  to address coordination needs. 
In rail, these needs are at least as pressing as elsewhere. Two instances of cooperative solutions have now 
been agreed: cooperation of path allocation by rail infrastructure managers in RailNETEurope, and the 
European Agency for Railway Safety and Interoperability. 
 
One of the major challenges that the implementation of open access in the EU railway area faces is path 
coordination and allocation. Directive 2001/12 revising Directive 91/440 only obliges (at least 
accounting) separation between operations and infrastructure and the provision of open access under 
transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions to international groupings and licensed railway 
undertakings. As previously mentioned, some problems might arise insofar: 
- railway infrastructure managers might prefer existing incumbents if no proper 
separation and incentives schemes are  realised so as to guarantee non-discriminatory 
access; 
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V -  Regulatory reform II: Introducing competition 
EC competition rules  have always been, in principle, applicable to the railway sector. Regulation 
EEC/1017/68 specifies the application of Article 81 and 82 EC Treaty to the transport sectors 
rail, road and inland waterways. As it covers the rail sector, in principle the latter has been 
subject to EC competition rules for the last 35 years. This was confirmed by the European Court 
of Justice in 1986 when it stated in the Nouvelles Frontieres case (Joined Cases 209-213/84 
Ministère Public v. Lucas Asjes, ECR. 1986, 1425) that the general competition rules apply also 
in the transport sector. However, because of the fragmentation of the European railway market 
and since Member States had granted exclusive rights to their respective national (“flag”) railway 
companies, until the early 1990s de facto no competition existed in this sector. In order to create 
a common railways market the Community has  since adopted several directives to foster 
competition in this sector, thereby limiting the exclusive rights granted by Member States to their 
respective railway undertakings45. These post-1990 developments square with the modern 
interpretation of art. 86 (then 90) for all network industries (cf. Pelkmans, 2001-b) 
 
Until recently, the market opening effect of directive 91/440 has been negligible. First, combined 
transport is by far the most difficult way in freight transport to make a profit and, second, 
traditional state-owned incumbents have so far not shown any interest into entering into 
groupings with newcomers. Instead they continue to co-operate among each other. 
 
In the railway market the consideration of actual competition began in earnest with the 
introduction of subsequent legislation (Directive 95/16) and the first railway package (in force in 
national legislation since 15 March 2003). The introduced legislation is aimed at promoting open 
access and inducing competition on rail apparently assuming some degree of contestability46. 
 
 
5.1 Open Access as a prerequisite for competition 
Since the first EU regulatory attempt (Directive 91/440) and its revision by Directive 2001/12 (1st 
Railway Package),  the Union has opted for a system that triggers open access on rail by 
requiring (at least accounting) separation between infrastructure management and operations.  
This is not the only option. Several alternative approaches can be found. One is that of vertical 
integration, with ownership and interconnections. This model has been followed by Japan, 
New Zealand and the US. In Japan it has culminated in the creation of regional vertically 
integrated monopolies with interconnection and open access provisions. In the US and New 
Zealand, the model of vertically integrated private companies prevails. 
Another option to consider is that of vertically integrated long-term franchises. This model has 
been followed by Argentina and Brazil and provides for the concessions to regional monopolies 
for long time spans (e.g. 30 years). 
 
Why did the Union opt for open access in Europe instead of other models? A priori, no model is 
per se first- best, since experience shows positive and negative effects (e.g. Japanese Railways, 
restructured according to regional vertically integrated concessions, seem to perform quite 
effectively and successfully47, but only after a full pension bail-out).  The choice between 
alternative reform routes very much depends on the intrinsic characteristics of traffic, scale, 
density and market demands in the different regions and countries.  
                                                 
45 Stehmann , 2001, op.cit. 
46  in the case European Night Services (ENS), the European Court of Justice  argues that potential competition would only exist if there was a 
realistic and concrete possibility of market entry. See case ENS, Eurostar, UIC, NS and SNCF versus Commission, joint cases n° T 374/94, T 
375/94, T 384/94 and T 388/94.  
47  See Yoshiyuki, 2003.   
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As a matter of fact, there are certain aspects of the European transport context that improve the 
fit of open access. European rail reform is similar to that in other network markets in that it 
combines liberalisation and market integration. 
Liberalisation responds to the need of revitalising entire sectors of the European economies and 
of radically improving their economic performance. Liberalisation is also deemed to be a driving 
force towards the creation of new markets, innovative industrial structures and business models 
through cross-border alliances and joint operations for a better exploitation of economies of scale 
and scope, while breaking the business logic based on national dimensions.  Market integration is 
long overdue. Transport is critical for the Internal Market to work properly. Cross-border rail 
(esp. in freight)  should perform efficiently, economically and reliably and exploit the proximity 
of urban and productions centres in a “hub-and-spokes” pattern that could particularly fit the 
geographical distribution of production and residential clusters in Europe. 
 
Worth mentioning is the fact that the EU Directives opted for a liberalisation of rail freight 
transport on the Trans European Rail Freight Network (TERFN - 50% of total EU rail network 
and 80% of traffic) as from 15 March 2003 with progressive extension to the overall network by 
the year 2006.48 
 
Passenger liberalisation will be proposed  in the Third Railway Package. It was not a priority of 
the 1st Railway Package for two reasons. The first one is a purely political one since passenger 
services touch upon very national sensitive areas such as the justification of services of general 
interest and safety concerns. The second one is made up of several economic arguments.  
 
Especially in the field of passenger rail traffic, economies of traffic density are crucial. Scheduled 
services operated by a single undertaking respond to increases in market demand by either 
longer/double deck trains or more frequent trains. Competition per se need not be the most 
efficient response to more demand as it might only duplicate the costs. The usual effect (Mohring 
effect) is likely to be that the revenues generated by the introduction of competition do not offset 
the costs of service duplication and the revenue losses on the incumbent operator, thus producing 
a sub-optimal allocation for society49. This is particularly true in regional/sub-urban traffic 
(where, due to sub-optimal scale, subsidies are needed). However, on international routes with a 
European dimension and where the market could compete with alternative modal choices (high-
speed rail vs. airlines on distances up to 500km-700km) duplication of services can eventually 
offset losses from economies of traffic density by gains due to the scale and differentiation of 
pan-European services (business services vs. economy; air-rail connections).  Careful further 
research should show the case for such choice. Therefore, competition among individual entities 
might replace the concept of international groupings on these routes (e.g. Thalys, Eurostar 
services)50  in the long run.  
 
                                                 
48 "Official Journal L164 of 30 April 2004 (a) REGULATION (EC) No 881/2004 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation); (b) DIRECTIVE 2004/49/EC OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways and amending Council 
Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and 
the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (Railway Safety Directive); (c) DIRECTIVE 2004/50/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability 
of the trans-European high-speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability 
of the trans-European conventional rail system; (d) DIRECTIVE 2004/51/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community's railways" 
49  Nash - Ibidem 
50  Monti, 2002  
26  
5.2 Open Access and Vertical separation vs Vertical coordination 
Some experiences (UK, to a lesser extent the Netherlands) have been presented as examples of 
the failure of vertical separation of rail infrastructure and service provision. Both cases are used 
to argue that only vertically integrated companies taking responsibility of the overall value chain 
can successfully manage a complex system (as the railway is).  
There is no doubt that huge economies of scope apply in the railway system and that incentives 
for vertical integration are strong. Nonetheless, is e.g. the UK reform a genuine failure?  It 
depends on what one focuses on. 
Vertical separation combined with massive entry represented a success story in terms of 
reversing modal shift in the UK (34% increase in passenger, 40% increase in freight carried, 20% 
increase in train mileage run, from privatisation to 1999)51. In Sweden52 a similar performance of 
rail services can be observed.. 
This is primarily due to a better focus on core competences. 
 
More precisely, the source of possible failures in the UK is on the infrastructure side: a private 
natural monopoly with large economies of scope. 
This is mainly due to two reasons: 
 
· Technical complexity, safety requirements, technical patchworks resulting from layered 
technology based on local requirements 
· High costs of infrastructure, renewal, maintenance, necessary levels of investments on a 
network that stays a natural monopoly and where incentives need to be closely supervised 
and quality and safety parameters need to be monitored. 
 
On the first point, Interoperability Directives should help simplifying and harmonising 
requirements over time. Once safety rules and essential requirements are set at a high level and 
detailed by means of EU Regulations on Technical Specification for Interoperability, mutual 
recognition should  apply and hindrances to  its application should be legally tackled. This will 
allow for a reduction in assets costs and, hence, economies of scope from vertical integration. 
 
On the second point, the UK experience shows that substituting a public natural monopoly with a 
private one does not improve the system. Railway technology does not allow for duplication of 
networks and abatement of its sunk costs.  Thus, a private natural monopoly will: 
 
· Either transfer its dividends to shareholders (compromising necessary investments in 
quality and safety) 
· Or be heavily regulated by a neutral authority (therefore, losing any incentive linked to 
ownership) 
 
Therefore, addressing incentive and ownership failures and assuring a sufficient and coherent 
level of investments (for safety and capacity) as well as technical simplification in railway 
infrastructure and systems amount to major tasks for governments and regulatory authorities, on 
the one hand, and industry players, on the other. 
 
As a prominent analyst noted53: “To date, the extent and degree of success of competition (even 
for the market) has been mixed and often limited, not least because it has proved difficult to 
challenge the position of the incumbent national railway operators. In the UK where this problem 
was avoided through complete break-up of the incumbent (in an attempt to reproduce analogies 
                                                 
51  McKensey, 1999 
52  Speech by Bylund, 2003   
53 Steer Davies Gleave – Ibidem 
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from energy and telecommunications), important losses in network synergies initially occurred as 
a result, and competition in the market had to be deliberately curtailed in order to protect 
successful bidders for competitively tendered franchises. It is therefore likely that any future 
liberalisation measures will need to be supplemented by complementary initiatives designed to 
preserve the benefits of an integrated rail network. Reconciling the dynamic evolution of a 
competitive rail market on the one hand and introducing administrative measures intended to 
simplify the experience of rail passengers on the other, will be a major challenge for EU 
institutions and the European rail sector alike”. 
 
 
5.3 Is the market capable of hosting competition? 
Arguing in favour of competition in rail can easily be justified if one focuses on current 
inefficiencies.  Significant welfare costs are nowadays generated by monopolistic behaviour of 
incumbents in protected markets where the highly unionised railway companies tend to defend 
rent-seeking. 
 
There are however, also good reasons to control liberalisation and avoid outright break-ups of 
former monopolies.  Pacing reforms could be a valuable option so as to avoid overly costly 
restructuring and adaptation, quality loss, social problems and instances of knowledge loss that 
are extremely costly for the knowledge-intensive railway sector. This should not be read as an 
argument against liberalisation. Most of the arguments against liberalisation of rail in the EU54  
tend to fall in the category of abusing public-interest motives for private interest protection. 
Objections such as the supposed threat to the provision of ‘services of general interest’ (cf. art. 
86, EC), cream-skimming on high value routes, the ‘deterioration’ of working conditions of rail 
for workers (shielded for more than a century against market pressures) and fears of higher ticket 
prices (in passenger) are either well-recognised in EU network liberalisation or (within 
reasonable limits) quite defendable as a superior way to serve the public interest. Controlling 
liberalisation must not be mixed up with such campaigns 55.  Indeed, the case for EU rail reform 
(section 2) is strong and the arguments in favour of liberalisation are many: optimal cross-border 
services, quality & service differentiation, quality improvements, larger scale for cost recovery, 
better response to customers, a decrease of rent-seeking and an increase in overall rail efficiency. 
Some of these arguments become stronger if coupled (as they are in the EU) to interoperability 
programmes. 
 
As table 6 underscores, services competition in the railway very much depends on the size of the 
market. In tiny markets, competition does not improve services, it erodes revenues for the 
incumbent and does not allow them for entrants and hence fails to enhance consumer surplus. On 
the other hand, when the scale of operations allows for entrants and market shares with sufficient 
turnover to be contested, competition engenders positive effects. 
                                                 
54 For political reasons and national resistance, liberalisation on rail passenger traffic was not dealt with in the first railway package and the issue 
seems to have attracted a certain interest in the approved second railway package, though no precise commitment to deadlines has been when 
drafting this paper 
55 Also, sequencing could be part and parcel of such controlled liberalisation.  “We find that reforms have efficiency-increasing effects but that 
the effect of reforms depends on sequencing: The introduction of multiple reforms in a package has at best neutral effects, but sequential 
reforms improve efficiency”. Friebel,  Ivaldi and Vibes – 2003  
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Table 6 – Introducing competition in rail is complicated 
 
Passenger Rail Economic characteristics Type of possible 
competition 
PSOs 
Short-distance rail Mohring effect –inefficient 
duplication of service 
Concessions (for track) Necessary for passenger 
rail 
Long-distance Needed scale and traffic 
density that allow for efficient 
duplication of services 
- Concessions (for track) 
- Open access (on track) 
o service differentiation 
valuable routes 
Necessary for passenger 
rail 
- on feeder/secondary 
routes 
- under specific contract 
Freight Rail Economic characteristics Type of possible 
competition 
PSOs 
Short-distance rail Mohring effect –inefficient 
duplication of service vis-à-
vis alternative modes (road 
haulage) with rare exception 
of specific feeder services or 
specific shipments (e.g. 
dangerous / bulky goods) 
Concessions (for track) Not necessary for freight 
rail  
- It might be an option 
to encourage transport 
of dangerous goods by 
rail 
 
Long-distance Needed scale and traffic 
density that allow for efficient 
duplication of services 
- Open access (on track)  
- Value added services on 
corridors (peak-slots vs. 
off-peak; timeliness vs. 
time flexibility; traceability 
of shipments) 
 
Not necessary for freight  
- It might be an option 
to encourage transport 
of dangerous goods by 
rail 
 
 
Where the scale, density and value of railway routes allow for efficient duplication of services on 
track and higher service differentiation (quality aspects, such as peak /off-peak services, on-
board comfort, value-added services), head-on competition on track can be an option.  
 
The crux of the matter is however to show that duplication of services on a specific route by a 
new entrant adds revenues that offset any incumbent losses. Therefore, a market analysis will be 
necessary to identify the points summarised in table 7. 
 
 
Table 7 - Railway markets  -competition analysis 
 
Market demand  
 
Static analysis - Is market demand sufficient to allow for at least two operators 
(is there a residual market demand for a second player?) 
 Dynamic analysis - Is market demand likely to increase following to new entry and 
improved choice under competition? 
- Is market demand likely to react to eventual price competition? 
Cost structure Static analysis - What is the cost structure of the incumbent?  
- Does its profit margin leave space  for new entrants? 
- Is it possible to disentangle services subject to PSOs from 
profitable services? 
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Cost structure Dynamic analysis - Can  competition be expected to lead to cost-cutting and 
rationalisation? 
- Does cost-cutting leave opportunities for new entry? 
- Does technology help reducing fixed costs for assets and 
variable costs for services  (in the long run)? 
- Does the separation between services under PSOs and services 
under competition help to increase performance? 
Barriers to entry Evolution of 
technical and legal 
aspects after the 
introduction of 
competition 
- Licenses 
- Safety requirements 
- Operational rules 
- (introducing) integrated computer reservation system 
- Multi-language operations 
- Interoperability problems  
- Transfers of know-how + training schemes 
-  European  technical standardisation of equipment 
 
The static and dynamic criteria will have to relate both to the size of the relevant market and to 
the cost structure of incumbents. The static analysis should reveal the potential for the market 
and assess whether there residual demand which allows a new entrant to establish itself without 
endangering the final social outcome (decrease in incumbent’s revenues not offset by consumer 
surplus). A static analysis can also scrutinise the actual cost structure of the incumbent and assess 
profit margins, competitive and non-competitive sources of costs (subject to PSOs). 
 
Of course, competition in rail requires a dynamic analysis by introducing change (as a reaction to 
competition).  The likely or actual introduction of competition might indeed lead to the 
optimisation of capacity use and allocation, thus allowing for increased frequency and / or 
differentiated services. If correct, demand might expand thus sustaining a new entrant to come 
into the market.  
 
Dynamic effects may also include a change of cost structures. Credible and sustainable 
competition is expected to induce management changes and create lean structures. By 
introducing competition, one can expect proper outsourcing strategies, elimination of 
redundancies and innovative investments encouraging performance. The dynamic effects of 
competition on costs will play towards the discovery of true costs and the elimination of non-
essential ones.  Technical efficiency should be expected to improve significantly. 
 
 
5.4 Competition for track and Public Service Obligations. 
Competition may lead to ‘inefficient entry’ in the sense of inefficient duplication of services 
when the scale of operation and market demand are not large enough so as to allow for cost-
recovery and profitable operations. In these cases, the revenue gained by the new entrant does not 
offset the revenue loss of the incumbent and most likely will not provide sufficient cash to the 
new entrant. Both the incumbent and the new entrant suffer from the establishment of 
competition and service will not necessarily improve.  This is typically the case of regional, sub-
urban and urban railway passenger services.  Experiences demonstrate that these markets are 
better served by a single operator under a concession regime or public service obligation.  
 
The following question is how to establish the right incentive scheme for the service to be 
performed effectively and with the highest quality. The answer in most cases lies in tendering for 
limited concessions of the provision of railway services. Tendering procedures for temporary 
concessions should include quality and service aspects (based on set benchmarks and key 
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performance indicators by the concessioning authority) and are revised at the end of every 
concession period.  
 
A key issue for this type of competition for tracks is the duration of the concessions. Experience 
in the UK shows that too short concessions (5-7 years) do not entail “ownership incentives” 
necessary for an asset to be efficiently operated and qualitatively improved. Long concessions 
(e.g. 30 years) imply too much monopoly power for the operator leading it to avoid quality and 
service improvements. In this regard, markets for concessions are orientating themselves towards 
concessions periods that are much longer than 5-7 years with intermediate revisions on the 
grounds of key performance indicators. 
 
Competition for track for regional, urban and sub-urban rail passenger services can work because 
elements that  induce service differentiation for long hauls (e.g. peak-time/off-time services, 
frequency, comfort, on-board facilities) are not  important for consumer choice. Indeed, the 
arrival of a competitor is likely to reduce the levels of performance and the overall service 
frequency without this being offset by larger revenues for the operators.  
 
 
5.5 Competition in long-distance rail for freight and passenger services 
The case of long distance rail is different because economies of scale, density of traffic together 
with dynamic effects of competition might allow for new entrants to conquer market shares. 
However, the interplay of these elements varies between passenger or freight rail.  
 
Recent studies based on development of scenarios confirm once again 56 that the scope of 
competition on railways is depending on route densities and the length of corridors. If corridors 
are long enough (so as to guarantee sufficient economies of scale) and the density potentials are 
relatively high, competition is expected to be effective. This is particularly the case for rail 
freight  using trans-European corridors with high-density potentials.  
 
Competition might be frustrated by other elements such as priority allocation mechanisms. The 
European railway system is characterised by the dual use of the infrastructure for both freight 
and passenger. This setting penalises freight services that are always second in priority in slot 
allocation. Models of access charges for both passengers and freight might solve this problem 
while efficiently allocating slots. 
 
From an EU internal market perspective, however, the lack of harmonisation of charging 
methodologies, the fact that they might work differently in each Member State and in respect to 
different services, and the general discretion provided in the EU rail directives, are likely to 
create distortions preventing well functioning competition on rail. 
 
The dual use of infrastructure entails other restrictive effects for the competitive exploitation of 
rail freight services, mainly because stand-alone freight lines would be less costly on all these 
accounts.   Cost-increasing factors for passenger rail include: stringent safety requirements, 
complex operational rules and more costly equipment connected to passenger service provisions; 
public service obligations for passenger services possibly distorting slot allocations. 
 
                                                 
56 Steer Davies Gleave – Ibidem; NERA - Ibidem 
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Box 3 - Frustrated hopes of IKEA Rail freight operations  
 
IKEA, the Swedish furnishing company, is one of the first companies to have bought 
train paths across two countries (Sweden and Germany) with original expectations to 
enlarge operations in wider continental Europe. IKEA has about 40 logistical 
Platforms and 180 sales points in Europe. Every year, something like 12 million m³ 
are moved between the platforms and the sales points. Transport represents 20 per cent 
of company’s costs. In an interview with the Italian magazine “L’Espresso (N.34, 21 
August 2003)”, Mr Anders Malmström (responsible for distribution in Northern 
Europe) revealed the company’s objective to lower logistical costs to 15 per cent. 
Therefore, the company aimed at moving 40 per cent of its production by rail by 2008 
while enlarging operations of IKEA Rail to Italy and Poland. IKEA Rail was operating 
until November 2003 between Sweden and Germany on a track length of 1044 
kilometres, five days a week on an average speed of 65 km/h (much higher than the 
often denounced slow average speed of international rail freight traffic (18 km/h57). In 
November 2003, IKEA Rail declared the closure of its operations. This failure might 
well be related to market barriers and high entry costs, although IKEA has not 
acknowledged this. 
 
 
 
One of the key issues in passenger services is the provision of services run under a public service 
obligation scheme versus them run under competition.  Incumbents claim that passenger services 
have to be operated under public service provision. On the other hand, supporters of 
liberalisation stating successful examples for the UK and some promising value added high-
speed rail services, maintain that liberalisation of passenger services will be beneficial for the 
sector provided that PSO schemes will be adopted for non-profitable lines on a contractual-
franchise basis. 
Those contracts will impose a well-specified exercise of services and might entail subsidies when 
the scale of operations or the size of the market does not allow for cost recovery and a reasonable 
mark-up. As matters stand today, it would be difficult and somewhat arbitrary to calculate the 
costs for PSOs, so as to identify markets where competition will be possible and where burdens 
of responsibility (and subsidies) for the provision of PSOs will lye58.  Unlike in other networks, 
rail PSOs are often still too general. 
 
A draft regulation has been proposed by the European Commission relating to public service 
contracts for passenger transport in the rail, road and inland waterway sectors. If adopted, this 
regulation could clarify more specifically the conditions for appropriate allocation of temporary 
exclusive rights in the provision of railway services under regulated competition (e.g. 
concessioning), thus reducing risks of possible market fragmentation and limited contestability 
that could result by arbitrary allocation of exclusive rights59.  
 
Another element discouraging head-on competition for passenger services is the relatively low 
level of fares on the continent. In many cases, they still appear to be regulated thus having a 
chilling effect on incentives and reducing actual and potential profits. However, as the high-
speed rail market suggests, in the presence of high quality services, railway undertakings are able 
to extract consumer surplus (e.g. sometimes by replicating the highly flexible reservation 
                                                 
57 European Commission – White Paper on Transport Policy for 2010. Time to decide. 
58 “It follows that, unless there was greater specification of PSO services at the European level, the viability of liberalised international services 
will be directly affected by the PSO decisions of the individual countries, according to their domestic policies”. EU Passenger rail 
liberalisation: Extended Impact Assessment - Draft Final Report, January 2004, Prepared for the European Commission by Steer Davies 
Gleave 
59  COM(2002) 107 final – 2000/0212(COD), OJ C 151E, 25.6.2002 
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systems, based on ‘yield management’ adopted by airlines) and obtain profit margins that might 
encourage competitors to enter the market. 
 
The introduction of high-speed rail has been successful and service provision for high-speed 
seems to be profitable. The market demand for passenger transport where efficient high-speed 
systems exist seem to give priority to high-speed rail below distances of 500km connections from 
and to city centres.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Air/ (high speed) rail substitution 60  
 
(decline of air transport shares (from Paris) in % 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows, for example, that the stretch from Paris to Lille has been practically 
entirely shifted to high-speed rail (=HST). Of course, this is a relatively short distance, 
where trains always have advantages. But even the Paris-Marseille route is subject to strong 
intermodal competition: a reduction of 27 % of air transport market share is considerable. 
 
Similar patterns could reveal that a certain degree of substitutability is more (for economy) 
or less (for business) a function of price.  A high degree of substitutability seems to exist 
between high-speed rail and airlines, sometimes replacing air traffic by rail (e.g. Paris-
Brussels, Brussels-Amsterdam) or engaging in seasonal discounts and fares competition 
(e.g. Paris-London; Brussels-London) 
 
In a recent study for the Commission (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004) on-rail competition is 
regarded as  feasible for passenger rail services on distances over 500 km. 
In the study distances between 200 and 500 km support 15 trains a day with 60 minutes 
frequency, and journeys between 500 km and 800 km. The market can support 6 trains a 
day, with 120 min. frequency. Beyond 800 km air travel takes over, except for night trains. 
Three ‘load factor’ levels are taken into consideration. Clearly, they are relatively long 
journeys (with either cross-border services or efficient cabotage possibilities) where 
passenger rail competition could be defended in a EU perspective. 
 
                                                 
60  Air Rail Intermodality Study - IATA's Air Transport Consultancy Services, 2003 
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VI. Conclusions and the way forward  
Over the years, railways have lost ground to alternative transport modes in a business 
environment and national regulatory frameworks protecting them from domestic and 
international competition. The heavy costs of investment in technology and substantial operating 
costs, increasing in a setting of soft budget constraints, undermined financial soundness. From 
the point of view of customers and consumers, market responsiveness and prices have been 
disappointing. Sustainable (freight) transport is not supported if rail fails to exploit the 
opportunities for diverting freight from road to rail. 
 
 The EU strategy for the revitalisation of the railways is opting for a step-by-step process of 
change and gradual introduction of regulatory and business reforms. Recent regulatory reforms 
and industry efforts – if properly managed, paced and implemented -  could lead to a Copernican 
revolution of the sector and contribute to its revitalisation. But the difficulties are numerous and 
the costs of mistaken strategies are high. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the EU process of 
rail reform will take much longer than the adoption of 2 or 3 rail packages since 2000. The 
reflection behind policies will require much more economic analysis and EU regulation will have 
to become more detailed for the internal rail market to open up effectively.   
 
          Let us summarize eight more specific conclusions from this survey: 
 
i. Rail does not allow infrastructure competition (with one unique exception in the US). 
International benchmarking of the cost of infrastructure (an imperfect substitute for 
infrastructure competition, with respect to cost revelation) is exceedingly hard due to the 
multitude of specific variables. 
 
ii. Rail markets suffer from several significant market failures including natural monopoly 
(very large sunk costs), economies of density, proper regard of safety and asymmetries of 
information. 
 
iii. The internal rail market does not yet exist, although in freight some progress has recently 
been made. The potential of the internal market is frustrated by at least seven technical 
and legal barriers. Given the practical inexistence of the internal market, EU competition 
policy cannot exercise more than a very marginal discipline either. 
 
iv. The EU has opted for vertical separation as a pre-condition to open markets and introduce 
competition , no different from other network markets. Whereas the benefits are probably 
similar in nature to other network industries, the costs of such separation are difficult to 
foresee and may well be far greater than in other network sectors. The principal reason is 
found in (costly) coordination failures. It is not clear, however, that the badly needed 
opening up of the internal market could be accomplished with alternative models of 
reform as applied in other parts of the world. For a start, it might require, initially, a much 
greater degree of central (political) decision-making than can realistically be expected for 
rail in the EU for a long time.  
 
v. Pricing issues turn out to be problematic on economic grounds and, if not harmonized far 
more extensively than at the moment, also on practical grounds (e.g. different systems in 
many Member States). The same goes for cost transparency, central to the emergence of 
effective cross-border competition. The adoption of marginal cost pricing as a basic rule 
for EU (freight) rail may be so problematic in actual practice that a combination of 
Ramsey pricing (given the incentives freight rail providers have to keep market share in a 
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competitive market) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs may yield more 
competition, more business for freight rail and fewer regulatory problems. 
 
vi. Capacity constraints on rail are incomparably more problematic than e.g. in electricity 
transmission or airlines, let alone, telecoms. The modest beginning of cross-border 
cooperation on path coordination and allocation in RailNETEurope is probably no more 
than a welcome first step, yet unlikely to be sufficient - even after workable arrangements 
have been formulated - for the internal market to function properly. 
 
vii. Introducing (cross-border) competition in rail, especially in freight, is long overdue. 
There are powerful arguments in favour, such as optimal cross-border services, quality & 
services differentiation, quality improvements, larger scale for cost recovery, better 
response to customers and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to 
conclude that competition in rail is always economically beneficial. It depends on the size 
of the market and on removing a host of barriers. Of course, PSOs must be carefully 
defined and costed. Coordination failures possibly emerging from vertical unbundling 
ought to be preempted (which requires regulation and close supervision). For passenger 
rail services the scope of competition – dependent on route densities and the length of 
corridors – is clearly more limited. 
 
viii. It goes without saying that all these issues, difficult as they are already, have to be 
considered in a dynamic perspective. Conduct and cost structures are likely to change 
given potential or actual reforms, and presumably even more so under potential or actual 
competition. Also, infrastructure investment and technology  - for infrastructure, rolling 
stock and safety & signaling – have the potential to generate enormous cost savings, 
especially when coupled to the EU interoperability programme, which, in turn, may well 
induce (more) entry and competitive conduct. Profitable highspeed passenger rail – partly 
substituting for air travel – forms an extreme example of what can be accomplished, even 
though this higher quality has required much higher prices and only prompted sharper 
intermodal competition. New technology, both available and in the pipeline based on 
ongoing R & D, for conventional rail, including freight, as well as investment to 
overcome bottlenecks in infrastructure can be of significant help to support the EU reform 
process.   
 
Having set into motion a ‘deep’ reform process, the EU should realize that the way forward 
ought to take into account a range of other elements, not having been dealt with in this paper. We 
mention five: 
 
§ Competition policy would need to ensure level-playing-field in the market for new entrants 
and incumbents (e.g. through effective supervision of access charging processes, abuse of 
dominant positions or concerted actions). In so doing, it will need to monitor national and 
local authorities as well in setting the limits to competition (e.g. in the name of the provision 
of public services, which could limit the contestability of the market). The introduction of 
competition goes hand in hand with thorough static and dynamic analysis of markets for 
railway services and their actual contestability. In this view, a necessary redefinition of 
markets and axes on a pan-European scale and the impact that technology can exert in 
eliminating technical barriers and lowering entry costs, will be crucial. 
 
§ The establishment of national railway regulatory authorities (NRRAs) overseeing capacity 
allocation61, regulatory pricing (e.g. price caps on use of infrastructure), subsidy levels, safety 
                                                 
61  Infrastructure managers provide for the path and capacity allocation and they are supervised by NRRAs and competition authorities  
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and technical requirements and the provision of railway licences is seen as a step to overcome 
possible asymmetries of information. However, in a European dimension, different 
institutional set up and competence portfolios for regulatory authorities can cause 
fragmentation of the internal market and hinder the one-stop-shop logic for new entrants.  
 
§ The niche nature of the sector with very specific knowledge and information flows is one of 
the greatest barriers to liberalisation. Know-how and information is a prime resource for 
incumbents. This prime resource is not only an element of asymmetry vis-à-vis the market 
and its customers but also vis-à-vis its regulators. The concentrated technical knowledge in 
the hands of few players, might involve phenomena of regulatory capture (e.g. in the 
definition of PSOs, licensing and access charging schemes), thus potentially distorting the 
necessary level-playing field. On the other hand, phenomena of knowledge loss (as the one 
produced by sudden liberalisation in the UK after the break-up of British Railways), might 
imply serious consequences in terms of safety and management. Reinforcing pan-European 
networks of knowledge in the field is one of the major goals of the European Union policies 
in the railway sector through RTD projects and networks of excellence, gathering and sharing 
expertise Europe-wide; 
 
§ A positive reaction of the sector itself in discovering new business opportunities and models 
and restructuring the way it currently operates is also necessary. The deepening of the 
internal market and the eastern enlargement prompt radical changes in infrastructure and 
services. Relocation effects in manufacturing industries and modifications in industrial 
processes (just-in-time) involve a considerable push factor in the transport industry, not to 
speak of additional trade flows and exchange of people. A number of business changes are 
already under way (e.g. acquisition of road-haulage logistical companies to increase the value 
chain; integration with airlines service; streamlining of value-chains; division of activity lines 
in core businesses and in order to respond to competitive pressure and new market 
conditions). Some of these changes are still far from being materialised and regulatory 
measures are still insufficiently transposed on a national basis62. Besides business moves, 
other initiatives could set the conditions for a rebirth of railways as a leading transport mode. 
Innovative lines of research are and will need to be pursued on the positive scale and scope 
effects of managing networks on a pan-European dimension (trans-European corridors vs 
national systems), so as to better respond to transport needs with a trans-European dimension 
and better reorganise infrastructure management along trans-European axes63. Further 
scenarios for reform have been anticipated in studies commissioned by international 
organisations (ECMT/OECD)64 foreseeing several competitive outcomes (interpenetration of 
markets by incumbents; mergers or joint ventures of infrastructure managers by corridors; 
mergers, consortia, code-sharing for freight and passenger lines among railway operators; 
emergence of specialised freight operators; emergence of transport integrators [ensuring 
control of shipments over transport value chain]; diversification of services); 
 
§ Eastern enlargement. The expansion of the EU railway networks with 8 more systems 
(Cyprus and Malta not having one)  creates great opportunities in the long run for rail freight, 
given the extra capacity on east-West axes, very high growth rate of east-west trade in the 
                                                 
62 On 9 July 2003 the Commission launched legal proceedings against 10 EU countries failing to notify the EC of any transposition of the 1st 
Railway Package to be implemented on 15 March 2003. European Commission IP/03/378 
63 First industry estimates perceive the possibility of completely changing the railway landscape and its profitability through the introduction of 
10000-15000km dedicated rail freight connecting major hubs for dispatching of shipments into dual-purpose conventional rail. Such first 
estimates have to be assessed by feasibility studies. These must verify effective cost-recovery for such an infrastructure in a reasonable amount 
of time that might encourage private public partnership schemes and guarantee relatively fast pay-back periods - ERRAC (European Rail 
Research Advisory Council) - European Strategic Rail Research Agenda - 2003 available on www.errac.org  
64 ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) - Summary of Principal Questions on Regulatory Reform and the Development of Rail 
Freight Markets - CEMT/CM(2000)19/FINAL 
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Union and the higher market share of rail freight in the East. However, the new member 
states will have to be incorporated in what is already an ambitious and complex reform 
programme, with major restructuring. There may also be significant implications for EU-
wide infrastructures.  
 
 
In the light of past experiences and given some lingering resistance to change, the revitalisation 
of railways in Europe can only be achieved if a coherent mix of policies, forward-looking 
investment plans, regulatory reform and appropriate supervision is promoted. As previous 
European experiences show, pacing reforms in a step-by-step approach is as important as 
introducing them. This will allow business actors to better absorb them and pro-actively adapt to 
them without incurring the risks of knowledge loss while creating the conditions for competitive 
markets. 
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